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Economists have argued that a high concentration of land holdings in a country can create powerful
interest groups that retard the creation of economic institutions, and thus hold back economic development.
Could these arguments apply beyond underdeveloped countries with backward political institutions?
We find that in the early 20th century, the distribution of land in the United States is correlated with
the extent of banking development. Correcting for state effects, counties with very concentrated land
holdings tend to have disproportionately fewer banks per capita in the 1920s. Banks were especially
scarce both when landed elites' incentive to suppress finance, as well as their ability to exercise local
influence, was higher, suggesting support for a political economy explanation. Counties with high
land concentration and fewer banks also had higher interest rates and lower loan to value ratios, consistent
with more restricted access to finance. Interestingly, counties with greater land concentration had fewer
loan losses during the Great Depression, consistent with borrowers in those counties being less risky,
even while they had more limited access to credit in the years leading up to the Depression. We draw
lessons from this episode for understanding financial and economic development.
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  What are the factors that cause differences in the development of the financial sector across 
the world? Some researchers have emphasized elevated demand such as the need for war finance, 
others the political institutions a country develops, others the origins of a country’s legal system, and 
yet others the constituencies or interest groups that emerge in a country.
2  This last view ties in to a 
long tradition emphasizing the political economy underpinnings of economic underdevelopment. For 
example, Engermann and Sokoloff (2002) suggest that the pattern of land holdings in a country, 
determined by the technology underpinning the crops produced, is an important factor driving 
economic underdevelopment. Specifically, they argue that economies where land holdings were very 
concentrated – so called “hacienda economies” – had elite groups that ensured rents for themselves 
while creating poor economic outcomes for their societies. 
  The precise channel through which interest groups operate is a matter of some debate. Some 
(see, for example, Acemogulu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005)) argue that the mediating channel is 
political institutions, as elite interest groups can create coercive political institutions that give them 
the power to hold back the development of economic institutions, and hence economic growth. Others 
(see, for example, Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloff (2003), Rajan and Zingales (2003 a, chapter 6) 
or  Rajan (2009)) have argued that a divided society may be sufficient to hold back the development 
of economic institutions, even if political institutions are broadly egalitarian.  
  One way to make progress on this debate is to examine patterns within broad political units 
such as countries and states where political institutions are held relatively constant.  To this end, we 
explore how the structure of banking across counties in the United States was driven by the 
distribution of land within the county. We focus on banks because they were, and in many areas, still 
                                                 
2 On the importance of war for finance (and vice versa), see, for example, Brewer (1989) and Peach (1941), on 
the origins of finance in political development, see, for example,  North and Weingast (1989), on the legal 
origins of finance, see La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Levine (2005), and on the 
role of constituencies or interest groups, see, for example,  Benmelech and Moskowitz (2007), Claessens and 
Perotti (2007), Haber and Perotti (2007), Haber (2005a,b), Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2006), Pagano and 
Volpin (2005), Perotti and Volpin (2007), Perotti and Von Thadden (2006), Rajan and Zingales (2003a, b), and 
Sylla (2005).   3
are, the most important source of local finance, and thus are important economic institutions. 
Likewise, we focus on the distribution of land because it does represent the diversity of agricultural 
interests, and agriculture was still a key sector at that time in the U.S. economy. 
   To set the stage, though, for why agricultural interests might have an incentive to influence 
the development of finance, it helps to get a flavor of the public discourse in the United States 
towards the end of the nineteenth- and the beginning of the twentieth century. Farmers felt 
increasingly marginalized and impoverished, and the growing Populist movement targeted the twin 
menaces of monopolistic railroads (allegedly charging exorbitant freight rates to carry goods from the 
Western states to the markets in the East) and tight money or credit. These issues helped transform 
agricultural grievances into a powerful political constituency at the national level, with access to 
credit and tight money featuring most famously in the 1896 Presidential election
3.  
The costs associated with limited access to credit were most obvious in the interaction 
between the small tenant farmers and the local store or furnishing merchant. In the agrarian South, a 
common form of borrowing was through a “crop-lien” loan, whereby the merchant required that in 
return for an advance of goods, the contracting farmer would  
“sign over, as a guarantee that the account would be paid, his “entire crop of cotton, cotton-seed, 
fodder, peas, and potatoes”. His personal property, chattels, and real estate, if he had any, might also 
be included in the mortgage, and in case he should find it impossible to pay his entire indebtedness 
out of the proceeds of the season’s crop, he was legally obligated to continue trading with the 
merchant who held the lien until the account should be settled in full….The farmer who gave a lien 
on his crop delivered himself over to the tender mercies of the merchant who held the mortgage. …he 
might buy only what the merchant chose to sell him. He was permitted to trade with no other 
merchant except for cash, and in most cases his supply of cash was too meager to be worth 
mentioning. He must pay whatever prices the merchant chose to ask. He must market his crop 
through the merchant he owed until the debt was satisfied, and only then had he any right to 
determine the time and method of its disposal….”
4    
 
                                                 
3 In the Democratic Convention that year, William Jennings Bryan brought the convention to its feet with his 
speech opposing the constraining Gold Standard, ending “You shall not crucify mankind on a cross of gold”.   
4 p43-44,  The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmer’s Alliance and the People’s Party, John D. Hicks, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1931.     4
While estimates of the extent of “debt peonage” should be treated with caution, one historian 
suggests that in the cotton South, for example, “three-fourths to nine-tenths of farmers were 
ensnared” and that the “credit purchaser paid twenty to fifty percent more for what he bought than 
what he would have paid if he had been able to buy for cash”.
5 
Initially, there was a conflict of interest between large landlords and the furnishing merchant 
because they both had an interest in tenant farmers. But “as time went on the two classes tended more 
and more to become one.” Landlords were drawn into the store business by “the desirability of 
supplying their tenants”, while “storekeepers frequently became landowners by taking over the farms 
of those who were indebted to them or by direct purchase at the prevailing low price”.
6   
Among landlords, large landowners had an incentive to ““accommodate” their own 
tenants…[which] gives them greater control over tenants, and unscrupulous landlords may make 
larger profits by charging higher rates.”
7 By contrast, small and medium farmers did not have the 
surpluses to lend out, and one detailed study of Texas concludes “on the whole, they [owners of small 
and medium farms] would rather the tenant would get his money in his own way”.
8  
If indeed there were profit opportunities to be made in lending to small and tenant farmers, 
why did banks and other formal credit institutions not enter this business? One argument is based on 
information asymmetries. As one author puts it,  
“this kind of credit business requires close supervision, even to the extent of directing the tenant’s 
farming operations in not a few cases, and such intimate knowledge and care the banks cannot give.”
9 
                                                 
5 Hicks (1931, p44). As Ransom and Sutch (1972, p123) explain, “The merchant established two sets of prices 
or cash prices and credit prices.  The cash price applied only if the goods were paid for when received. The 
credit price was always substantially above the cash price, thus assuring the merchant a rate of return on his 
loan.  The farmer, for his part, had little choice.  By the middle of the growing season he was invariably out of 
cash, and therefore had to charge his purchases.” 
6 Hicks (1931, p32). Haney (1914, p54) writes that in most parts of central Texas, “over 90 percent of those 
tenants who owe the store are also indebted to their landlords for larger or smaller advances.” 
7 Haney (1914, p54). 
8 Haney (1914, p55). 
9 Haney (1914, p54)   5
Others argued that the supply of formal credit was artificially constrained through legislation. 
Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) show that laws preventing creditors from seizing homes tend to hurt 
the poor’s access to formal finance, because they have little collateral to pledge other than their 
homes. By contrast, such laws benefit the rich, who have other collateral. Similarly, usury laws, that 
place ceilings on interest rates that can be charged, limit the extent of lending from regulated financial 
institutions to the poor because the poor typically are riskier and lending to them is not profitable at 
rates below the ceiling. Not only are informal lenders such as landlords and merchants harder for the 
government to audit than a regulated bank, but they also have a variety of ways to get around the 
ceiling, including taking repayment in kind.  
Some saw careful design in such laws for they argued “legislation like North Carolina’s 
Landlord Lien Law, which gave landlords an automatic crop lien against any advances extended to 
tenants working their land, strongly reinforced the system of ‘debt peonage’.”
10  
Finally, the merging of the roles of landlord and furnishing merchant provided these 
individuals with considerable local power, and historical narratives observe that these individuals 
often used their control of the local judiciary and political system, and their monopoly over local 
commerce to deter bank entry and other threats to the status quo (Goodwyn (1978)).
11 In sum then, 
there were a number of ways that large landowners could limit the access of others to formal finance, 
and control the supply of credit. 
There were other benefits for the rich landlord to limiting access to credit than simply 
extracting rents from the less-well-off when they purchased goods.  The landlord would also enjoy a 
competitive advantage, for instance by being able to buy land cheaply when small farmers were hit by 
                                                 
10 Ransom and Odell (1986, p13). 
11 He was the largest landholder…in one county and Justice of the Peace in the next and election commissioner 
in both, and hence the fountainhead if not of law at least of advice and suggestion…He was a farmer, usurer, a 
veterinarian. He owned most of the good land in the county and held mortgages on most of the rest. He owned 
the store and the cotton gin and the combined grist mill and blacksmith shop in the village proper and it was 
considered to put it mildly, bad luck for a man of the neighborhood to do his trading or gin his cotton or grind 
his meal or shoe his stock anywhere else—The furnishing merchant in The Hamlet, by William Faulkner.   6
adversity, or by having privileged access to loans in the midst of a prolonged drought—creating so 
called land syndicates.
12 He could prevent unskilled workers from obtaining the funds needed to 
educate themselves and expanding their own employment opportunities, thus ensuring there would be 
a reserve army of workers for field work (see Galor,  Moav, and Vollrath (forthcoming)).  He might 
also prevent the emergence of alternative centers of economic power and status by limiting their 
access to finance (Chapman (1934)).   
 
Along these lines, Calomiris and Ramirez (2004) argue that unit banking laws (that is, laws 
preventing in-state banks from opening multiple branches, and out-of-state banks from entering the 
state) provided large farmers with insurance during periods of agricultural distress. Specifically, 
national banks or state banks with branches could foreclose more easily on loans, and transfer capital 
to less distressed areas. By preventing such reallocation, unit banking laws provided borrowers 
insurance. Of course, wealthier farmers would benefit more from keeping capital “in-house”, and 
Calomiris and Ramirez indeed find more restrictions in states with greater farm wealth. 
To some modern economists, despite the vast literature on the political economy of branching 
restrictions, the notion that banking in the United States may have deliberately been kept 
underdeveloped and uncompetitive, because of the interests of a few, seems implausible. How could 
the interests of a few prevail? After all, the U.S. was a democracy, albeit an imperfect one, in the 
early 20
th century.  
  Some writers of that period believed that it was the imperfections in democracy that allowed 
the elite to capture policy making. Haney (1931, p52) argues that landlords in areas with a large 
number of black tenant farmers had substantial political power (because of the denial of political 
rights to blacks), and through their ability to manipulate party conventions, used this power to 
perpetuate landlord interests more widely. However, we do not need to appeal to perversions of the 
                                                 
12 Clark (1946) for example describes the connection between the concentration of credit and land holdings, as 
local merchants gradually acquired land syndicates, taking over  land titles from distressed small debtors.    7
democratic process to obtain departures of policy making from public interest. Clearly, even in a 
democracy, moneyed interests can overcome public interest, especially if the latter is not organized.
13 
Indeed, the Populist movement can be seen as an attempt to organize and give political expression to 
the concerns of the masses.  
It is also important to note that claims about the lack of access to credit and the need for 
banking reforms fuelled agrarian unrest in areas other than just the rural South (Stock (1994)).  In 
North Dakota, for example, after winning the 1916 gubernatorial race with the help of small farmers, 
the Populist Party created the United States’ first state owned bank, the Bank of North Dakota. The 
bank’s charter begins: 
 “Nor is it strange that under these conditions private interests sometimes take advantage of the needs 
of the people to keep down the prices of farm products, and exorbitantly to advance the prices of the 
things the farmers had to buy and the rates of interest for farm loans…the only permanent remedy lay 
in state ownership and control of market and credit facilities” (Bank of North Dakota (1920). 
 
  Thus far, we have presented contemporary arguments for why landlords might have had an 
interest as well as an ability to suppress access to formal credit in parts of the United States where 
they were powerful. Nevertheless, since our interest is in examining the historical evidence with the 
view to extracting modern lessons, we have to approach it with the appropriate degree of skepticism.   
First, it is not obvious landlords only had the incentive to suppress formal credit. Instead of 
focusing on preserving his share of a small local pie by limiting bank competition and credit access, 
and thus squeezing the small farmer and tenants, the large landowner might have been better off 
increasing the size of the local pie, even if his share were diminished. For instance, greater access to 
formal finance would draw more potential buyers into the land market, allowing the value of his own 
land to appreciate. Therefore whether stronger landlord interests lead to a more constrained financial 
sector and less financial access is an empirical question, which we attempt to answer. 
                                                 
13 For example, it has been argued that large landowners controlled much of Florida’s banking system during 
the 1920s, and their attempts to channel credit into real estate, often by bribing state regulators, contributed to 
Florida’s  banking crash of 1926 [Vickers (1994)].   8
  Second, as we suggested above, the landlord may have been the only viable source of 
finance. After all, he was close enough to monitor tenant crops, and was in a better position to make 
loans against the crop. In other words, landlord lending may have been efficient given the absence of 
alternatives. However, this does not fully explain why legislation limiting access such as usury laws, 
homestead exemptions, and landlord crop-lien laws were enacted. Nevertheless, it is a possibility we 
must investigate. 
  Third, a finding of a correlation between measures of the strength of landlord interests and 
limitations on access to formal finance need not imply the former caused the latter. Not only do we 
have to pay attention to issues of causation, we have to try and provide evidence of the channels 
through which causation may have worked. 
  Economists have not ignored these issues of access to finance and monopoly power in the 
United States, quite the contrary. Indeed, for a while, there was a heated debate amongst economists 
over whether differentials in interest rates across different regions in the United States around the turn 
of the nineteenth century were indeed evidence of monopoly power based on legal restrictions on 
entry (see, for example, Davis (1965) and the responses in Binder and Brown (1991), Eichengreen 
(1984), James (1976), and Sylla (1975)), or whether the variation in interest rates was because of 
differences in risk. However, the limitations of the data left the debate somewhat inconclusive, and as 
banking markets in the United States became very competitive, the debate became primarily one of 
historical interest. We believe that these questions deserve to be revisited, not only because they shed 
light on the process of financial and economic development, which is of contemporary interest to 
many developing countries, but also because we have access to richer and more detailed data than in 
these past studies (we have data at the county level rather than at the region or state level).      
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We believe that greater land concentration is a 
reasonable proxy for both the strength of large landowners and the presence of exploitable small 
farmers and tenants (tenants were typically small farmers). To motivate the paper, we start in section I 
by showing that there is a correlation between increases in land concentration and increases in state   9
level legislation restricting banking. Of course, this evidence should only be taken as motivation, 
since we do not establish causation.  
We continue our analysis in section II by focusing on exogenous determinants of land 
concentration in the United States. In particular, agricultural economists believe the distribution of 
land holdings was driven by rainfall. Large-scale plantation-like agriculture, surrounded by smaller 
tenant farmers were favored in areas with high rainfall. By contrast, more moderate sized farms, but 
without much dispersion in size, were found in areas with moderate rainfall. Using rainfall then as an 
instrument for land concentration, we look to see if the concentration of land holdings had an 
influence on the presence of banking institutions and the availability of finance.  
We find that land concentration is strongly negatively correlated with the number of banks 
per capita in a county (and thus positively correlated with more limited access to finance). To bolster 
the notion that this correlation is not something mechanical (and recognizing that any instrumentation 
strategy has limitations) we provide a variety of tests in section III showing that the impact of land 
concentration was most pronounced in situations where the landed elite had the greatest incentive and 
ability to exert influence. Thus there is some support for the political economy explanations of the 
variation in land development. 
In section IV, we turn to data on the cost and availability of loans against land, and show that 
farmers in counties with higher concentration of land holding paid higher interest rates and had less 
access to formal credit. Of course, one possible explanation is that farmers in these regions were 
riskier. We do not have a direct measure of agricultural loan losses at the county level. So in section 
V, we turn to another measure of loan risk – the fraction of deposits in banks that failed in the period 
1931-36 (bank failures fell substantially after 1934) to the fraction of deposits at the beginning of the 
period. If indeed farmers in counties with higher average loan rates were riskier, we should see a 
greater fraction of failed bank deposits in these counties. Indeed, if anything, we see the opposite. 
There was a smaller fraction of failures in counties with concentrated land holdings, consistent with 
the notion that access to formal credit was limited to safer borrowers, and limitations on competition   10
allowed banks to enjoy rents that helped keep them safe (even while allowing informal finance from 
landowners to potentially flourish).     
Of course, no paper can completely eliminate all doubt. But to the extent that the data 
permits, we establish that local interest groups did affect the development of formal finance, which 
may explain the extent of popular anger expressed by small farmers in the Populist movement.  
That said, it is quite possible that bad outcomes may have emerged without malevolent intent on the 
part of the landlords. If the country started off with an underdeveloped banking sector or laws 
inadequate to meet the credit needs of a growing economy in the late nineteenth century, counties 
where yeoman (middle-sized) farmers were well represented may have pushed harder to change the 
status quo. By contrast, large landlords may have been less concerned about access to credit, and in 
counties where they held more power may have pushed less forcefully to facilitate access to finance. 
Thus benign neglect could explain many (though not all) of our findings. The lessons that one takes 
away for economic development depend not on intent but on outcomes. Whether the economic 
institutions (such as banking) remained underdeveloped because of malevolent suppression or benign 
neglect by powerful constituencies does not change the fact that constituencies shape economic 
growth.   
For, while it is on financial development, our paper has broader implications. A recent trend 
in explaining the underdevelopment of nations has been to attribute it to the historical weakness in 
their political institutions such as democracy and constitutional checks-and-balances (see, for 
example, the literature emanating from North (1990) and North and Weingast (1989)). While U.S. 
political institutions in the 1920s were far from perfect, they were also far from the coercive political 
structures that are typically held responsible for persistent underdevelopment. Yet even in the United 
States, we find large variations in the development of enabling economic institutions such as banking, 
between areas that had different constituencies but were under the same meta-political structures. The 
significant, and potentially adverse, influence of constituencies even in such environments suggests 
that fixing political institutions alone cannot be a panacea for the problem of underdevelopment.     11
 
I.    LANDED INTERESTS AND STATE LAWS  
A.   A proxy for divergence of interests among the landed 
What could be a proxy for the strength of landed interests and their desire to limit access to 
finance? The classic descriptions of debt peonage (see, for example, Ransom and Sutch (1973)) 
suggest large landowners involved in plantation agriculture squeezed rents out of small, typically 
tenant, farmers. Others have argued that large landowners wanted to limit access to finance so that 
they could monopolize access to the limited savings in the locality, especially in a downturn (see 
Calomiris and Ramirez (2004)). In any of these hypotheses where there is a group of larger farmers 
who “exploit”, there has to be another group of small farmers or tenants who are explicitly 
“exploited” (as in the debt peonage hypothesis) or are implicitly “exploited” (for instance, if they 
contribute savings to the local pool but do not get loans in a downturn because their access to finance 
is deliberately left underdeveloped, as in Calomiris and Ramirez (2004)).  
One measure of the strength of these two constituencies is the Gini coefficient of land 
farmed, which measures the degree of inequality of land holdings. If land holdings are very unequal, 
large landowners could have both the ability and incentive to limit access to finance, while if land 
holdings are relatively equal (whether uniformly large or small), no one has the power or the interest 
to alter access for others.
14  
Our measure of the concentration of land holdings is based on the distribution of farm sizes 
as in Ramcharan (2009). The data are collected by the U.S. Census Bureau at the county level for 
each of the decennial census years 1890-1930. We have information on the number of farms falling 
within particular acreage categories or bins, ranging from below 3 acres up to 1000 acres, where a 
farm is defined as “all the land which is farmed by one person, either by his own labor alone or with 
                                                 
14 This presupposes, of course, that those without land either do not have the basic minimum surplus to be worth 
squeezing (such as field hands) or live in towns, far from the clutches of the landlords. We will show that a 
greater fraction of activity in manufacturing (a measure of non-land activity) does diminish the effect of land 
concentration on financial development and access.   12
the assistance of members of his household or hired hands”. Note that a tenant is also a farmer by this 
definition. Assuming the midpoint of each bin is the average size of farms in that bin, we construct 
the Gini coefficient to summarize the farm acreage data (see Table 1 for a precise formula and 
definitions). The Gini coefficient is a measure of concentration that lies between 0 and 1, and higher 
values indicate that farms at both ends of the size distribution account for a greater proportion of total 
agricultural land—that is, the holding of agricultural land is unequally distributed.  
In the 1920s, the average Gini coefficient of a county is 0.426, the 99
th percentile county is at 
0.687, the 1
st percentile county is at 0.2 , and the standard deviation 0.10 (see Table 2 for summary 
statistics). The correlation between the Gini for a county and the share of agricultural land in small 
farms (below 20 acres) is positive, as is the correlation with the share in large farms (above 175 
acres). The correlation between the Gini and the share in medium sized farms (between 20 acres and 
175 acres) is negative. Thus counties with high Gini coefficients tend, as we would expect, to have 
more land in both small, as well as large, farms. Interestingly, as a result of the greater weight in 
small farms, counties with Gini above median have smaller farms on average than counties with Gini 
below median.  In Figure 1, we plot the regional variation in the data. Even in the South, which 
generally had higher levels of land concentration, there was significant heterogeneity among counties.   
As motivation, it is useful to see whether there is a correlation between our measure of 
divergence of agricultural interests, land concentration, and seemingly inefficient state laws 
governing banking. In the United States, historical political battles, such as the one between Andrew 
Jackson and the Second Bank of the United States, led to more limited federal involvement in 
banking. As a result, the system was highly decentralized—effectively 48 different banking systems 
(Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005)).
 Economic efficiency would suggest that each system should have 
been tailored to the needs of the local economy. Yet some of the observed choices seemed sub-
optimal.    13
B.   Branching regulation 
For example, branch banking—that is, allowing a single bank to operate many branches 
spread over the state—should have led to a more efficient and stable financial system, as banks would 
have been better able to reap scale economies, diversify the risks of the local economy, and offer 
wider credit access to the population (Ramirez (2003), Carlson and Mitchener (2006)). Yet, only 16 
states allowed branching in 1920 (Deheja and Lleras-Muney (2007)).   
Clearly, there was hysteresis in banking structures. For example, once unit banks were in 
place, branching was perceived as a threat, for it would have allowed bigger urban banks to compete 
in rural areas, threatening the rents of small rural unit banks. As a result, unit banks formed 
associations, or joined hands with state regulators, to oppose branching (White (1982)). Furthermore, 
Economides, Palia, and Hubbard (1996) show that states with unit banking pushed for federal 
branching restrictions on national banks and for federal deposit insurance (which particularly favored 
small unit banks), suggesting that unit banks had political power in those states.  
But this begs the question of why some states chose in the first place to have no branching, 
while others allowed it. Sylla et al. (1987) argue that taxes on bank profits and dividends were an 
important source of state revenue. By preventing out-of-state entry, states could extract more taxes 
from the protected in-state banks. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) emphasize the added revenue that 
each in-state bank could obtain if it enjoyed a local monopoly, and suggest that this accounted for the 
limits on branching by even in-state banks. 
These arguments, however, apply to all states. Why did some states go in for unit banking 
and others not? Moreover, if revenue was the primary objective, could they have not chosen a less 
distortionary means than creating monopolies and then taxing them heavily? Did states that chose unit 
banking have few other revenue options?  
The hypothesis we want to test for why some states chose to impose more restrictions on their 
banks is based on a “bottom-up” view, where local (that is, county-level) preferences for restrictions 
so as to limit access to finance aggregated up to a state level preference. While this is not inconsistent   14
with state-level rationales for restrictions, it does add an additional facet to the study of the political 
economy of state regulations. Specifically, the hypothesis is that the large landowners’ influence over 
the local financial system would have been made easier, in part, by legal branching restrictions, which 
prevented national banks and large state banks from entering local markets.  
The dependent variable in Table 3 is a binary variable equaling one if a state permitted 
branching in a particular year. We use data for the years 1900, 1909, 1919 and 1929 (see Dehejia and 
Lleras Muney (2007)), so adjacent data points for a state are separated by a decade, enough to allow 
some change in land concentration and in legislation. Using a simple linear probability model, we 
estimate the relationship between land concentration (the computation for each county is described in 
Table 1, and is aggregated up to the state level for each decennial census year) and the probability that 
a state permitted state wide bank branching. We include state fixed effects, year indicators, and 
cluster standard errors at the state level. While a decade is a relatively small interval from the 
perspective of legislative changes and changes in land holdings, there does seem to be a measurable 
correlation. The simple linear probability panel estimate in Table 3 Column 1 suggests that a one 
standard deviation increase in land concentration at the state level over time is associated with a 0.16 
decrease in the probability of observing laws permitting branching. This estimate does not change 
significantly when we condition on demographic, economic and political variables (Table 3 Column  
2).
15  
All we have established is a correlation between our measure of divergence of political power 
and economic interests, that is, land concentration, and legislation that the literature associates with 
                                                 
15 A less well-studied method of constraining credit is through usury laws. Low ceilings on interest rates make it 
difficult to charge rates that allow a lender to break even on high-risk credits. As a result, only the rich with 
unimpeachable creditworthiness will be able to borrow when usury ceilings are low. Benmelech and Moskowitz 
(2007) collect data on usury ceilings across the United States ending in the late nineteenth century and indeed 
find that usury limits do adversely affect lending activity. They also find that the strictness of usury laws 
increases with the extent that other groups are excluded from political activity, suggesting that usury laws are a 
form of economic exclusion. We have data on land concentration in 1890 while Benmelech and Moskowitz 
have data on state usury laws in 1890. Marrying the data they collected, and were kind enough to share, with 
our data on land concentration, we find (results available from authors on request) that land concentration in 
1890 is negatively and significantly correlated with the interest rate ceiling imposed by usury laws in 1890, and 
the estimate increases in magnitude with the addition of obvious controls.   15
the suppression of finance. There are a number of problems with taking these results as more than 
motivation. First, there could be political and institutional differences across states that might account 
for the results (though persistent differences would be absorbed in the state fixed effect). Second, the 
direction of causality is unclear – for instance, could branching legislation have led to greater land 
concentration? In what follows, we delve deeper to the county level where we can keep state-level 
political institutions and legislation constant, and examine the effects of local constituencies. We also 
can take the issue of causation more seriously.   
II.   LANDED INTERESTS AND COUNTY-LEVEL BANK STRUCTURE: THE BASIC TEST  
We turn now to county level data on land inequality from 1890-1930 to help measure the 
impact of the concentration of agricultural land on the various indicators of banking structure. The 
state-level results suggest that as land holdings in states became more concentrated, state-level 
banking legislation was more restrictive of financial development.  Clearly, in addition to influencing 
state-level legislation, historical narratives have noted that large landowners had the ability to frame 
local legislation and its enforcement. They also possessed the local economic clout that allowed them 
to direct or withhold business in order shape local bank structures [Vann Woodward (1951), Weiner 
(1975)].  
For example, to the extent the sheriff enforced some bank claims more willingly than others, 
and to the extent that large landowners used their power to direct business to some banks and not 
others, local powers could alter the structure of banking. The crop lien system—which we address in 
a subsequent section—treated the lien of landlords as superior to other claimants in the case of 
default, and restricted the ability of tenant farmers to access outside sources of finance.  
Even when small farmers were able to mobilize in order to tackle the credit supply problem, 
they allegedly were thwarted by landlord interests. For example, small farmers in Texas created a 
“joint-note plan” in 1888. This plan pooled the collective lands of small farmers into a note that was 
to be used as collateral for credit, which in turn would have been allocated to members of the farmers’   16
cooperative. Banks in Texas, allegedly under the influence of landlords, refused to accept the note, 
and the plan failed.
16  
The hypothesis is that, correcting for state effects, the greater the power of local landed 
interests, as proxied for by the degree of land concentration in a county, the greater their ability to 
shape the structure of banking in the county.  
A.   Banking density and concentration 
One measure of bank structure is to simply count the number of banks in a county, 
normalized by the number of people in, or area of, the county. Bank density at the county level is an 
informative measure of access to finance as well as of bank market structure during this period 
(Evanoff (1988)). Distance was an important factor in economic activity at this time, as Federal 
involvement in road construction had not yet begun, road transport networks were relatively 
primitive, and automobile use was still limited (Baum-Snow(2006), Ramcharan (2008)). And during 
this period, policy debates on the availability of credit often revolved around the geographic 
proximity of banks, as access to financial services were more restricted in counties with limited 
banking density (Cartinhour and Westferfield(1980))
 17. 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provides county level data on the number 
of state and nationally chartered active banks in the county, beginning in 1920. The box plot in Figure 
2 indicates high levels of banking density in the upper Mid West, but reveals substantial variation 
even among Southern counties.  
                                                 
16 See Goodwyn (1978), pg. 77 for a fuller discussion. The farmers  noted that “…all efforts made were 
unsuccessful, and tended to produce the conviction that those who controlled the moneyed institutions of the 
state either did not chose to do business with us, or they feared the ill will of a certain class of business men 
who considered their interest antagonistic to those of our order and corporation.” 
17 Like the US during the sample period, bank density remains an important measure of access to financial 
services in many developing countries today because of their limited transport networks. In these countries, 
density significantly predicts credit usage by firms and households (Beck et. al (2007)).   17
We begin by examining the relationship between the density of banks in a county and the 
concentration of land holdings. The dependent variable in Column 1 in Table 4  is the number of 
banks per capita in a county in 1920. The explanatory variables are the concentration of farm land 
holdings in the county, state dummy variables, and a number of geographic controls including the log 
of county area and its distance from various waterways. Waterways were centers of economic 
activity, with some of particular relevance to agriculture. For instance, waterways such as the Great 
Lakes in the upper mid west, and the Atlantic Ocean along the East coast helped spur industrialization 
and demand for financial services in those regions (Pred (1966)). Including these variables help 
control for plausibly exogenous determinants of a county’s prosperity and the kind of economic 
activity it might undertake.   
The coefficient estimate of concentration in the OLS regression is negative and strongly 
statistically significant (at the 1 percent level). A one standard deviation increase in land inequality is 
associated with a decline in the per capita number of banks circa 1920 of 0.31of its standard 
deviation. In Column 2, we repeat the same exercise for 1930 and again find a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient estimate for land concentration that is similar in magnitude to the 
1920 result. In Column 3, we pool both cross-sections, and include county fixed effects. Thus, the 
coefficient estimate on the Gini captures the correlation between changes in land concentration and 
changes in banks per capita, controlling for the potential biases that can arise from geography, soil 
types, location and any other potentially relevant unobserved time invariant county characteristic that 
might linearly be correlated with land concentration. Most interesting, this coefficient is also negative 
and significant at the one percent level, and the estimated magnitude of the impact of concentration in 
the fixed effect estimate is about 30 percent larger than the 1920 OLS results.  
Before making too much of this, we should recognize that there are potential biases in the 
estimated coefficient. Well known theoretical arguments predict that economic inequality can itself be 
shaped by credit availability and other forms of asset market incompleteness (Aghion and Bolton 
(1997), Bannerjee and Newman (1991), Galor and Zeira (1993)), making reverse causality a likely   18
feature of the data. More banks for example might mean more credit availability, allowing more 
people to buy farms, and reducing concentration. However, the biases could go in either direction. 
More competition amongst banks may mean weaker relationships between banks and farmers, and 
could lead to greater foreclosures of marginal farmers in times of distress, leading to greater land 
concentration (see Calomiris and Ramirez (2004) or Petersen and Rajan (1995)). If this effect is 
present, our OLS estimate would understate the true effect of concentration on banks per capita. The 
larger coefficient estimate for land concentration in the fixed effects estimation suggests that this 
direction is plausible. To better correct for such reverse causality, we turn to instrumental variables.  
B.   Land Concentration Again. 
Clearly, a large number of factors have historically determined how land in a particular 
county is distributed (see Gates (1973) or Haney (1931)). These include the historical settlement 
patterns (Western frontier or Eastern seaboard), the nature of settlers (immigrants from overseas or 
settlers from previously settled areas in the country), the role of the government (including land 
grants to railroads and universities), and the role of past events like the Civil War, financial crises, 
and droughts.  
There is, however, a large literature in agricultural economics that suggests land 
concentration in the United States is also related to weather patterns (Ackerman and Harris (1946), 
Gardner (2002), Heady (1952), Tomich et. al (1995)). The underlying logic rests on the idea that 
given the technologies of the period, crops suited for plantation agriculture such as sugar cane, 
tobacco, fruit, and nuts thrived in warmer counties with regular and heavy rainfall. Some of these 
crops such as sugarcane required processing soon after harvesting. The need for significant capital 
investments in the mill, as well as the possibility of hold-up of farmers by the mill owner meant the 
land and the mill had to be jointly owned (see, for example, Williamson (1985), Hart and Moore   19
(1990)), with economies of scale stemming from the mill carrying over to the land and warranting a 
large plantation.
18  
Furthermore, because of the seasonality of work on plantations, it would be reasonable for 
workers to rent small plots where they could grow other crops such as vegetables. Thus large farms 
focused on plantation-style agriculture would also often be surrounded by smaller, tenant, farms, 
naturally leading to a high measured Gini. By contrast, grain—wheat and barley—which are better 
suited to more temperate climates, also exhibited fewer economies of scale, and were associated with 
more moderate-sized and equitable land holdings.  
The key aspect of weather driving crop choice is rainfall. Virginia tobacco, for example, 
requires rainfall between 23 to 31 inches per annum, while Nebraska wheat usually thrives in regions 
that receive between 14 to 21 inches of rain per annum (Seitz (1948), Myers (1940)). Even within 
states, more arid counties—the Piedmont region of central Virginia for example—may have had a 
more equitable distribution of farm sizes because of their suitability for grain production.
 19  
Engerman and Sokoloff (2003) also employ a similar argument to explain the role of geographic 
endowments in shaping historic cross country differences in land inequality across North and South 
America. And using US census data as early as 1860, Vollrath (2006) provides evidence consistent 
with the role of geographic endowments in shaping land inequality across a sample of US counties. 
In sum then, our instrument for land concentration is rainfall, and the mediating channel is the 
kind of crops that the prevailing pattern of rainfall facilitates.
 In Table 5 we present correlations of our 
measure of land concentration with the fraction of area covered by different crops in the county and 
                                                 
18 In some countries, of course, co-operatives in sugar farming and production have led to joint ownership of 
land and mill without large amounts of land being held by a single owner. Why co-operatives  have more 
limited presence in the United States is a question that is beyond this paper.   
19 Interestingly, cotton was not one of the crops that required plantation-style agriculture – even though 
substantial labor was needed to harvest the crop quickly soon after the bolls opened to avoid cotton spoiling 
from dust or rain, once the crop was harvested, it could be processed in due course. Thus labor, rather than 
capital was essential to cotton production, and following the emancipation of the slaves, small farms became 
more dominant in cotton.     20
with average annual rainfall (pooling data from 1920 and 1930). As Table 5 shows, there is a 
significant positive correlation of 0.35 between average rainfall and land concentration. The higher 
the average rainfall, the less the share of basic cereals, other grains and seeds, and hay and forage like 
sorghum in the crops grown in a county. Indeed, these were typically crops grown in the Mid West 
and areas with relatively less rainfall.  
By contrast, fruit and nuts, which were typically grown in both plantations and small tenant 
plots in Florida, parts of Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, as well as California and the upper 
Midwest, are found more in counties with higher rainfall, as also are vegetables. Consistent with the 
discussion above, the share of county production in basic cereals, other grains and seeds, and hay and 
forage land is significantly negatively correlated with land concentration, while the share in fruit and 
nuts, as well as vegetables, is positively correlated with land concentration. The detailed acreage data 
in the Agricultural Census of 1910 provides additional corroboration. For instance, the share of farm 
acreage devoted to sugar cane—a capital intensive plantation crop—is positively correlated with both 
land concentration in 1910 and historic rainfall patterns.
20  
Of course, to be a reasonable instrument, rainfall should not directly drive the demand, or 
supply, of banking services, other than through land concentration. Perhaps it is easiest to think of 
rainfall driving the demand for banking services. If rainier areas are more productive, for example, 
one could argue, then it is likely that farmers would be richer, and demand more banking services. So 
rainier areas would have more banks (given the supply curve), and this would attenuate any negative 
effect we would expect to see between instrumented land concentration and banking (thus biasing the 
tests against the hypothesis).   
As the first row of Table 6 suggests, agricultural land in counties with above median rainfall 
were somewhat more productive, producing $15.95  per acre in 1920 versus $15.11 per acre for 
                                                 
20 For the farm acreage devoted to cane sugar, the correlation coefficients are 0.098 and 0.066 for land 
concentration and rainfall respectively. These correlations are significant at the 5 percent level, and are robust to 
the inclusion of the state dummies.    21
counties with below median rainfall. The difference in productivity widens in 1930 ($9.61 per acre 
versus $ 7.35 per acre), after a period of falling agricultural prices. By contrast, we find that counties 
with higher than median rainfall had smaller median farm size. Given that these counties also had 
higher Gini coefficients (0.46 vs 0.37), this would suggest they had a few really large farms and many 
small farms, as argued earlier. Finally, note that the percentage of crops that failed in any of the 
counties in 1930 was below 1 percent, suggesting that higher average historical rainfall was not 
necessarily correlated with significantly lower crop failures – the crops planted seemed to vary 
appropriately with rainfall patterns.
21  
So, taken together, do these data suggest that counties with higher rainfall were composed of 
borrowers that would have less need for credit or less creditworthiness to obtain it, or do they suggest 
the opposite? On the one hand the land was somewhat more productive, and crop failures in 1930, 
though low across the board, were slightly lower in rainier counties. This does not suggest 
significantly lower need or lower creditworthiness. On the other hand, farm sizes, by and large, were 
lower. However, the evidence from studies on farm loan defaults in the 1930s does not suggest that 
defaults were correlated with size (see, for example, Jones and Durand (1954) and the studies cited 
therein). The rationale for this somewhat surprising finding is that those who held small pieces of land 
typically supplemented their income through other work – for instance on plantations or in towns  
(Jones and Durand (1954, p175)). So it is not a priori obvious that counties with greater rainfall had 
borrowers who had lower need for banking services, especially credit, or were less creditworthy.    
If we look at two other proxies for economic activity in Table 6, it is again not obvious that 
counties with higher rainfall were less creditworthy. First, the share of value added by manufacturing 
in the county turns out to be somewhat higher in counties with higher than median rainfall in 1920 
(37% versus 25%), though the difference narrows in 1930 (50% versus 43%). This would make farms 
                                                 
21 This is not to say that drought and crop failures were not a cause for farm distress in the inter-war period, only 
that data from the farm experience in 1930 does not suggest that areas with higher rainfall were more prone to 
distress.    22
in counties with higher than median rainfall more credit worthy because of access to non-farm work. 
By contrast, the share of owner occupied housing is lower in counties with higher-than median-
rainfall in 1920 (50% versus 58%), with the difference narrowing again in 1930 (49% versus 55%). 
While this is consistent with less creditworthy households in counties with greater rainfall, it is also 
consistent with lower access to credit in these counties. Indeed, despite having higher productivity of 
land in counties with above-median rainfall, the median value of an acre of land is significantly lower 
in such counties (see Table 6) – a difference that could again be driven by the differential availability 
of credit. And finally, when we examine banks per capita, the difference is quite extraordinary. There 
are twice as many banks per capita in counties with lower-than-median rainfall than in counties with 
higher-than-median rainfall, both in 1920 and 1930. Interestingly, the average size of banks, as 
measured by bank deposits per bank, does not differ much (if anything, they are slightly smaller in 
counties with higher-than-median-rainfall), suggesting that the lower number of banks in counties 
with higher-than-median rainfall is not because they are larger banks.      
In sum then, rainfall seems to drive land concentration by affecting the distribution of farm 
sizes, and does not obviously affect the demand for credit, other than through its effect on 
concentration and perhaps credit. It is a plausible instrument, certainly exogenous, but also likely to 
satisfy the exclusion criterion. However, it would be useful in our tests to correct for some of the 
obvious explanatory variables identified above to ensure that they do not drive any results we find 
(though we also have to be careful that by including “endogenous” explanatory variables like owner 
occupancy, we do not absorb some of the explanatory power of land concentration for access to 
credit).  
At the same time, no natural instrument can completely satisfy the exclusion criterion. Rather 
than abandoning any attempt at examining important historical data, we offer a battery of tests that 
would help build an overall pattern of results rather than rely on one single test that would depend 
excessively on the plausibility of the instrument. Any critic then has the more onerous task (than   23
simply pointing out the endogeneity of the instrument) of explaining why their alternative explanation 
would account for all the facts we present. 
C.   Instrumental Variables Estimates 
In the first column of Table 7B, we present estimates for a first stage where the dependent variable is 
land concentration in 1920 and the explanatory variables are the mean rainfall in the county computed 
over the last century, state dummies, and the geographical variables. The coefficient estimate on mean 
rainfall is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level, consistent with the literature. 
The second stage IV estimates are reported in Table 7A, Column 1. The coefficient on instrumented 
concentration is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. As with the fixed effects 
results, the IV coefficient is larger in magnitude than in the OLS regression, suggesting the OLS 
estimate is biased towards zero. In this case, a standard deviation increase in land concentration 
reduces the number of banks per capita by about 1.2  standard deviations.  
D.   Basic Concern with Specification 
 There is the concern, of course, that land concentration might proxy for some omitted 
variable that is also correlated with the number of banks per capita. In particular, a poor, low skilled 
population, as well as the very young, might not have the ability to farm land independently and 
might also be an unattractive target market for banks. We should also account for the possibility of 
discrimination, both in terms of blacks not having access to education, and in terms of their being 
denied access to financial services (see Ransom and Sutch 1972). Therefore, we include as additional 
controls the fraction of the county population that is illiterate, the fraction that is young, and the 
fraction that is black. Moreover, because banking density might be directly affected by the size and 
spatial distribution of the population, we include the log population, as well as the fraction of the 
population that is urban (reflecting the degree to which population is unevenly distributed across the 
county). For instance, the more urban the population, the more the population is crowded in a few 
areas, and the fewer the bank offices needed to service them.    24
Of course, these demographic controls are arguably less exogenous than the geographic 
controls we included earlier. Nevertheless, it is heartening that in Column 2 in Table 7A the 
coefficient estimate of concentration in the IV regression is negative, strongly statistically significant, 
and indeed a little larger in magnitude with these additional controls than the coefficient estimated in 
Column 1. This suggests that concentration does not proxy for these controls. This will be our 
baseline regression. In what follows, we conduct some additional robustness checks. 
In Table 7A Column 3, the dependent variable is banks per capita in 1930, and we estimate 
the IV regression with the full panoply of geographic and demographic controls. The coefficient 
estimate for land concentration is again negative and strongly statistically significant. In Table 7 
Column 4, the dependent variable is a different measure of bank density, banks per square kilometer 




Much of the increase in the number of banks occurred after 1890, as federal and state 
authorities competed to weaken chartering requirements, capital requirements, reserve requirements, 
and portfolio restrictions in order to attract more banks into their system (White (1982)). The number 
of state banks grew from 2534 in 1890 to 14512 in 1914 while the number of national banks grew 
from 3484 to 7518. Therefore a significant part of bank structure evolved post 1890. Land inequality 
in 1890 thus predates much of the structural change, and could also be a plausible instrument for land 
concentration in 1920. We find that when we replace average rainfall as the instrument in the basic 
specification in Table 7A Column 2 with land inequality in 1890, the coefficient estimate of 
                                                 
22 One concern may be that a county with uniformly large farms will have a low Gini. While this is not 
inconsistent with the hypothesis being tested (there is no need to repress finance if there are no small 
farmers/tenants to exploit), it is important to check that this does not drive our results.  Therefore, we 
recalculate the Gini coefficient using only those counties with farm sizes in all bin categories—we are left with 
about 55 percent of the sample of counties.  The coefficient estimates for the Gini are, however, qualitatively 
similar, and are available upon request.   25
instrumented land inequality in 1920 (see Table 7A Column 5) is negative and significant. 
Predetermination does not, however, imply the instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction.  
An alternative instrument frequently suggested to us is the standard deviation of rainfall, as 
spatially covariant weather risk might also shape the distribution of farm sizes (Ramcharan (2009)). 
However, the variation in weather related agricultural risk can impact local banking structures 
through a number of different channels, potentially threatening the exclusion criterion. But to gauge 
the sensitivity of our results, we add this variable to our instrument set in column 6. The estimated 
impact of land concentration on bank density is similar to the previous results, and standard over-
identification tests do not detect a violation of the exclusion criterion—the Hansen J-statistic is 1.16 
(p-value=0.28). Instead of using the standard deviation of rainfall as an instrument, we can include it 
and other measures of weather risk and local climatic conditions (estimates available from authors) as 
control variables. The estimated impact of land concentration is qualitatively unaffected
23.   
Yet another possible instrument is the variability of land elevation within a county (with 
higher elevations having different crops and different optimal land sizes). When the variability of 
elevation is used as an instrument for concentration in our baseline estimation instead of average 
rainfall, the coefficient on concentration is negative and statistically significant. But when included 
with rainfall, standard over-identification tests reject its use as an instrument. Again, the baseline 
results are robust to controlling for elevation variability.  
Given that these additional instruments do not add to the analysis, and arguably could fail the 
exclusion criterion (elevation could be correlated with the cost of transport), in what follows we will 
use average annual rainfall as the instrument in our baseline, as this variable is more likely to satisfy 
conditionally the exclusion criterion. 
                                                 
23 In addition to the core distance from waterways measures, the full range of weather and geophysical controls 
include the annual average number of frost days—days when the temperature dips below freezing—and  
growing degree days in the county, as well as the historic standard deviation of these variables. We also include 
both the mean elevation in the county, and the topographic variability of the terrain.  Please see Table 1 for 
definitions and sources.   26
Standard errors 
We computed robust standard errors in the estimates above. However, it could be argued that 
we should correct standard errors for possible correlation between physically proximate counties, a 
correction that is warranted if nearby counties have common historical experiences that shape their 
banking markets. 
Following this logic, the correlation in the error term between county i and county  j may be 
proportional to the distance between the two counties. We follow Conley [1998] and Rappaport 
[1999] and assume a spatial structure to the error covariance matrix. Specifically, for county pairs 
further than 150 kilometers apart—measured as the distance between the counties’ geographic center-
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We re-estimate standard errors using GMM and find that the previously-estimated coefficients 
continue to remain statistically significant. This adjustment typically increases standard errors, and in 
what follows, we report these more conservative distance-adjusted standard errors. 
E.   Rainfall as a proxy for demand side factors. 
Given that the negative correlation between land concentration and banks per capita or per 
area seems fairly robust to time period and choice of instrument, let us turn to a different issue – 
could the instrument, rainfall, proxy for factors that reflect the demand for finance? One way to 
address this is to include explanatory variables that proxy for demand and see whether these diminish 
the coefficient estimate on land concentration.  
The problem, of course, is that proxies for demand could also reflect the supply of finance, 
which is the channel we are focused on. For instance, we would think that counties with more owner-
occupied housing are likely to be richer and have greater effective demand for financial services (it is   27
well established in the literature that the rich have more serviceable demand for financial services 
than the poor). However, the availability of credit is also likely to make it easier for households to 
buy rather than rent. Thus the fraction of owner-occupied housing is also likely to be a proxy for 
credit supply. Similarly, one could criticize almost any economic proxy for demand.  
Nevertheless, we are on stronger ground if we find that the inclusion of reasonable proxies 
for demand does not alter the estimated coefficient on instrumented land concentration significantly. 
We identified a number of economic variables in Table 6 that varied substantially between counties 
with high rainfall and counties with low rainfall. Let us see what happens when we include them. 
 In Table 8, we start by including in the baseline regression in Column 1 both the log average 
size of farms and the log of the number of farms in the county – perhaps smaller farms are not credit 
worthy or perhaps if there are a few large farms, only a few bank outlets are needed to service them. 
The coefficient estimate for neither variable is significant, while the coefficient for land concentration 
remains relatively unchanged from the baseline (the magnitude is marginally higher, and despite a 
higher standard error, the coefficient is statistically significant). Next in Columns 2-4 we include the 
share of owner occupied housing, land productivity, and the value of land per acre in turn, and find 
similar results – a relatively unchanged and still significant coefficient estimate on land concentration. 
Of course, one could ask what would happen when we include all the variables simultaneously. 
Unfortunately, the standard errors blow up. This is probably to be expected – we identified all these 
economic variables because they vary with our rainfall instrument (which is positively correlated with 
concentration), so putting them all in the regression is likely to result in multi-collinearity. 
 F. Land Concentration Working Through Other Channels 
It may be that it is not land concentration, but the presence of farms of a certain size that 
drives the availability of banking services. Therefore, we include in the baseline regression the share 
of land area under operation by farms in each size bin. These land shares have the potential to 
mechanically absorb much of the explanatory power of the Gini for land concentration, and this 
coefficient declines by about 45 percent, but remains significant at the 1 percent level (results   28
available from authors). So the distribution, rather than only the share of land in each size bin, 
matters.   
It could be argued that different kinds of crops imply different demands for financing. We 
include in the baseline regression the value of each type of crop grown in the county, expressed as a 
share of total crop values in the county. The coefficient on land concentration is qualitatively the 
same (results available from the authors). 
It could also be argued the effect is driven by Southern states. When we estimate a coefficient 
on concentration separately for non-Southern states in our baseline, it is negative and statistically 
significant (results available from the authors).    
  In addition to finance, the landed elite may have sought control over other local policies, 
including the suppression of public goods such as education (Galor  et. al (2008), and Ramcharan 
(2009)). And rather than reflecting the direct influence of land concentration on  local banking 
structures, these results might indirectly reflect the success of these groups in limiting human capital 
investment, and thus, the demand for finance. The baseline specification already controls for 
illiteracy, but we also include the per capita education expenditures in the county. This variable is 
available only for 1930, and we run our baseline specification using banks per capita in 1930 as the 
dependent variable. The coefficient on land concentration remains qualitatively similar to the baseline 
(results available from authors).  
  The set of possible alternative explanations one could advance for the negative correlation 
between land concentration and banks per capita is well nigh unlimited. Therefore, having addressed 
some important concerns, let us instead check in other ways whether this correlation might represent 
the influence of landed interests on access to finance. To the extent that these other checks bear out, 
any alternative explanation has to pass a stiffer test – it has to explain not just the correlation between 
land concentration and banks per capita but also these other correlations.   29
III.   THE INFLUENCE OF  LANDED INTERESTS  
We therefore turn to more direct evidence that landed interests were influential in 
determining banking structure. Were landed interests more inclined to assert their influence when the 
ostensible incentive to do so was higher? What if the channel through which they could control 
finance was suppressed? Were landed interests more favorable to the financiers they could control 
than to those they could not control? And were landed interests more assertive when their overall 
ability to exert influence was higher? 
A.   Tenancy 
  Many of the arguments about the incentives of large land owners to limit access to finance 
revolve around tenancy. Land owners could negotiate lucrative share cropping contracts with cash-
strapped tenants or sell goods at a high price where access to credit was limited. Also, because large 
farmers were usually owners while small farmers were tenants, in counties with high levels of 
tenancy a higher concentration in land holdings would likely reflect a more skewed distribution of 
economic and political power than in counties with low levels of tenancy. Thus landed interests 
would have both a greater interest and ability to limit finance in counties with greater tenancy.  
To test this, in Column 1 of Table 9, we include an interaction between the fraction of farms 
in the county operated by tenants and land concentration in the baseline regression, controlling 
directly for the impact of tenancy using both linear and quadratic terms. The interaction between land 
concentration and the share of tenant farms in the county is negative and significant at the one percent 
level. For a county at the 25
th percentile level of tenancy in the sample, a one standard deviation 
increase in inequality is associated with about a 1.1 standard deviation decline in banking density. But 
for a county at the 50
th percentile of tenancy, the impact is about 26 percent larger. Interestingly, the 
direct correlation of tenancy is positive and significant. Evaluated around the median levels of 
concentration and tenancy, a standard deviation increase in tenancy is associated with a 0.05 standard 
deviation increase in the number of banks per capita. This is consistent with the view that tenants had   30
a greater demand for finance and, absent the influence of landed interests, would have attracted more 
banks per capita. 
 
Sharecropping and cash tenants    
It is useful to distinguish between sharecroppers and cash tenants. Sharecroppers had so little 
ready cash that they contracted to pay a share of their output as rent. The implicit interest rates in 
these contracts were often as high as 150 percent, with nearly half of share tenants borrowing about 
100 percent of their expected income from their share of the crop (Brogan (1994)). Thus, because the  
profitability of share cropping depended on the underdevelopment of the financial system, landed 
interests would have been more likely to oppose wider credit access in counties where share cropping 
was more common. Unlike sharecroppers, cash tenants owned their harvest, paying landlords a fixed 
cash rent up front. These tenants were typically better off since they were either able to self finance 
the rent and cost of farming or had pre-arranged sources of financing. 
In Column 2, we include an interaction between the fraction of farms operated by 
sharecroppers and land concentration, as well as the fraction of sharecroppers and the fraction of 
sharecroppers squared directly. In Column 3, we do the same for the fraction of cash tenants. In 
Column 2, for a county at the 25
th percentile level of sharecropping in the sample, a one standard 
deviation increase in inequality is associated with about a 0.89 standard deviation decline in banking 
density. But for a county at the 50
th percentile of sharecropping, the impact is about 15 percent larger. 
Interestingly, the direct effect of sharecropping measured at its mean is positive, suggesting that 
counties with greater sharecropping had, ceteris paribus, more demand for finance, and more banks 
per capita, but the effect of concentration was to reduce the presence of banks.   
In contrast to share croppers, the interaction term between concentration and the fraction of 
farms operated by cash tenants is positive, small and not statistically different from zero. For a county 
at the 25
th percentile level of cash tenancy in the sample, a one standard deviation increase in   31
inequality is associated with about a 1.20 standard deviation decline in banking density. But for a 
county at the 50
th percentile of cash tenancy, the impact is about 3 percent smaller.  
In sum, the negative relationship between land concentration and banks per capita seems 
most pronounced in counties where there was likely to be the greatest demand for credit, and hence 
the greatest incentive for landed interests to control it.  
B.   Crop Lien Legislation 
We have seen that crop lien laws were one of the principal tools that the landed elite allegedly 
used to restrict credit from banks and limit their business (Ransom and Sutch (1977, 2001), Van 
Woodward (1951)). These laws made the landlords’ claims on tenants superior to other creditors, 
effectively preventing banks and merchants from lending to tenant farmers. Although such laws were 
deeply unpopular among small farmers, the landed elite used their political influence with legislatures 
throughout the South to enact them.   
Texas, for a period, was an important exception. In part, because of different electoral rules 
that briefly allowed small farmers to elect a Populist governor, Texas was the only Southern state that 
actually passed legislation restricting the maximum liens that landlords could claim
24. The legislation, 
passed in 1915, also limited the shares that landlords could negotiate in a share cropping contract--1/3 
of the cotton crop and ¼ th  of the grain (US Census (1940)). The Texas Supreme Court—appointed 
mainly by the landlord dominated legislature--eventually declared the law unconstitutional in 1929. 
Nevertheless, for a time, Texas’ crop lien legislation imposed a less onerous barrier to bank entry in 
rural areas, implying that the impact of land concentration on banking density in Texan counties 
would have been weaker compared to counties in other Southern  states during our sample period.  
                                                 
24 The Populist Movement in the United States is often thought to have begun in Texas with the founding  of the 
Grand State Farmers’ Alliance in the 1890s. By the early 1900s, the state passed the Terrell Act in 1905 which 
created a direct primary system, allowing voters rather than party elites to select the gubernatorial nominee in a 
direct election. This of course created a wave of populism and reforms, of which the 1915 law is an example. 
However, the legislature was still dominated by the landed elite, and they eventually impeached the Governor 
three years after the passage of the 1915 legislation (Newton and Gambrell (1935)).   32
In Column 4 of Table 9, we restrict the baseline specification in 1920 to Southern counties, 
but allow the impact of land concentration on banking density to differ for Texan counties. The 
estimates are generally imprecise, and in 1920, five years after the law, the impact of land 
concentration on per capita banks, if anything, is more negative in Texan counties. However, 15 years 
after the initial passage of the Texan legislation, the impact of concentration on per capita banks is 
significantly more muted in Texan counties compared to other Southern counties in the 1930 cross-
section (Column 5).  Indeed, the coefficient estimate on land concentration in Texas is essentially 
zero. 
C.   Relative Power of Landed Interests 
Landed interests are likely to have had more influence on the structure of banking if they are 
a dominant economic power in the county. But this was a period when the manufacturing sector, an 
important consumer of financial services, was growing. It is reasonable to think that in counties where 
the economic power of the agricultural sector was offset by the power of the manufacturing sector, 
the effect of land concentration on bank structure would be weaker. 
One measure of relative economic power is the ratio of the value of manufacturing output to 
the value of manufacturing and agriculture output. In Table 9 Column 6, we include the interaction 
between manufacturing share and land concentration in our baseline regression, taking care to include 
manufacturing share and its square directly.   
The estimates suggest that as the strength of manufacturing interests in a county increase, the 
adverse impact of land concentration on the per capita number of banks falls. The point estimates in 
Column 6 suggest that for a county at the 25
th percentile level of manufacturing share in the sample, a 
one standard deviation increase in land inequality is associated with about a 1.40 standard deviation 
decline in banking density. But for a county at the 50
th percentile of manufacturing share, the impact 
is about 14 percent smaller. Note that it is hard to argue that this reflects a greater demand for banking 
services in counties with more manufacturing share, because we control for the direct effects of 
manufacturing (through both linear and squared terms). Indeed, the direct effect is negative,   33
consistent with the fact that agriculture was undergoing a boom till the early 1920s, and may have 
been a greater source of demand for banking services than manufacturing. 
D.   National vs State Banks 
The early years of the 20
th century were years of fierce competition between federal and state 
regulatory authorities in a seeming race to the bottom (White (1982)). National banks were chartered 
by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency in Washington DC, while state banks were chartered by 
state authorities. As some of the banking scandals of the 1920s suggest, state chartered banks were 
easier for powerful landed interests to control than nationally chartered banks (see, for example, 
Vickers (1994)). One would expect, therefore, that landed interests would discourage the spread of 
banks, but be particularly averse to the spread of national banks. 
  In Table 10 Column 1, we report our baseline specification, but with the dependent variable 
being the number of national banks per capita in 1920 . The coefficient on land concentration is 
negative and statistically significant, as is the coefficient in Table 10 Column 2 where the dependent 
variable is the number of state banks per capita in 1920. Thus landed interests discouraged both types 
of banks, a reassuring finding. In Table 10 Column 3, the dependent variable is the share of national 
banks to total banks in the county. The coefficient on land concentration is negative and significant – 
there are not just fewer banks of any kind but relatively fewer national banks in counties with 
concentrated landed interests. Note that by including state indicators, we control for any direct 
legislative impediments to the setting up of national banks in the state. 
  Before putting too much weight on this finding, one concern needs to be addressed. Until the 
relaxation of the 1864 National Bank Act in 1913, national banks were barred from mortgage loans – 
that is, loans against land (Sylla (1969)). There is disagreement about the effectiveness of this 
restriction (Keehan and Smiley (1977)). Nevertheless, and despite the tremendous change in bank 
activity over this period, it is plausible that the past legal restrictions on agricultural loans may have 
had some effect on national bank presence in counties with concentrated land holdings in 1920. But   34
this is an unlikely explanation for our findings -- for this to be a factor in explaining relatively lower 
national bank presence in concentrated counties, counties with higher land concentration should have 
been more agricultural. Yet Table 6 suggests the opposite – counties with higher-than-median 
concentration land holdings had a somewhat greater presence in manufacturing.    
E.   Distance from State Capital 
 We have provided evidence suggesting that landowners influenced state regulation to favor 
their private objectives. In most cases, state governors appointed the state bank commissioners, and 
politics often shaped chartering and regulatory decisions (Mitchener (2005))
25. To the extent that state 
power was important, one might expect that at this time –when physical distance mattered greatly --
that powerful landowners in counties that were physically closer to the state capital might have had 
greater influence on bank structure than landowners who were further away. We thus allow the 
impact of land concentration to depend on the distance between the county seat and the state capital 
(calculated with US Census geographic data). The county’s distance from the state capital also enters 
as a linear and quadratic term to absorb any direct impact on bank structure.  
In Column 1 of Table 11, there is some evidence that concentration may have had a larger 
negative impact on banking in counties closer to the state capital. But consistent with the fact that 
state bank chartering and regulations were determined in state capitals, these results appear to be 
driven by state banks (Column 2). At the state capital, a one standard deviation increase in land 
concentration is associated with a 1.8 standard deviation decline in bank density. This impact is about 
20 percent smaller in counties located one standard deviation away from the capital.  
By contrast, the Comptroller of Currency in Washington DC chartered and regulated national 
banks using a system of national bank examiners. One should not expect distance from the state 
                                                 
25 Using previously secret government documents, Vickers (1994) note for example that land developers often 
overcame chartering obstacles by bringing powerful politicians into banking deals. Land developers then used 
bank deposits for unsecured personal loans for themselves, politicians, and bank regulators. These loans were 
rarely repaid.      35
capital to matter for national banks. Indeed, the distance interaction term in Column 3, where the 
dependent variable is national banks per capita, is small and not different from zero. 
  
IV.   LAND CONCENTRATION AND ACCESS TO CREDIT 
Having provided some evidence that political economy may have been responsible for 
differences in bank structure across counties, let us examine another aspect of the allegations at that 
time -- that there were few banks per capita in counties with concentrated land holdings because 
landed interests wanted to suppress access to formal sources of credit. A natural question is whether 
formal credit was actually scarce in such counties.  
A.   Credit Conditions 
To address this question, we hand-collected several indicators of local land mortgage loans 
from the 1930 US Census. We have the average interest on farm mortgages held by banks, a proxy 
for the cost of credit. We also have data on the fraction of indebted farms, and the debt to value ratio 
for farms. Finally, we have the amount of bank mortgage credit, which when scaled by local state 
bank deposits, gives us a credit to deposit ratio, a standard measure of local credit activity.
26  
Around 50 percent of farms were indebted in 1930, the average mortgage debt to value ratio 
was around 37%, while the average interest rate in 1930 was 6.48%. The average ratio of mortgage 
debt to bank deposits across counties was 56%. In Figure 3, we use a box plot to depict the regional 
variation in the average cost of credit. Consistent with the notion that credit markets in California and 
the Pacific states were more geographically integrated, there is less variation in the average interest 
rate across counties in that region (Calomiris (2000)). In contrast, credit markets in the South were 
generally more segmented, and the dispersion in the interest rate is higher among those counties.  
Of course, it is possible to argue against each of these variables taken alone as a measure of 
the supply of credit – they could be a measure of effective demand, as determined both by the need 
                                                 
26 We scale by state bank deposits, given the earlier caveat that state banks may have been more into lending 
against land.    36
for credit as well as the creditworthiness of the borrower. However, assuming the underlying 
distribution of creditworthiness is the same across counties, the simultaneous prevalence of lower 
interest rates and higher credit volumes is more consistent with higher supply than higher demand.  
Indeed, the simple correlations in Table 12 suggest that counties with lower interest rates also had a 
greater fraction of indebted farms and higher loan to value ratios.  
To focus further on this aspect, we extract the principal component from our four proxies for 
access to credit. The first component explains about 41 percent of the variance in the data, nearly 
twice as much as the second component. Moreover, it correlates negatively with interest rates and 
positively with the proxies for credit volume; the share of indebted farms, the debt to value ratio, and 
the mortgage credit to deposit ratio (see Table 12). Therefore, we use the first component as a 
summary measure of local credit supply conditions.  
Thus far, we have argued that rainfall determines land concentration which, in turn, 
determines banks per capita.  We now take this one step further by saying that banks per capita 
determines access to credit, that is, the interest rate charged and the volume lent. The system of 
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We estimate the impact of local bank structures on the various measures of access in equation (1). 
These local bank structures are determined by local land concentration (equation (2)), which depends 
on the mean rainfall in the county (equation (3)). The system is exactly identified, and equation (1) 
can be estimated using instrumental variables. We include our usual geographic, demographic, and 
state fixed effects controls in each equation.
27  
                                                 
27 In equations (2) and (3), we could use banks per capita in 1930. However, some of the measures of access we 
have (for example, mortgage credit to deposits) reflect the cumulative consequences of lending over time. In 
that case, it might be more appropriate to use banks per capita in 1920. Fortunately, the results do not depend   37
The IV estimates in Table 13A Column 1 suggest an economically large relationship. A one 
standard deviation increase in bank density in 1920 is associated with a 0.38 percentage point or 
about a 0.66 standard deviation decrease in the average mortgage interest rate. The coefficient 
estimates for the effect of bank density on the fraction of indebted farms in Column 2, the mortgage 
debt to value ratio in Column 3, and the mortgage credit to deposit ratio in Column 4 are positive, 
economically large, and with the exception of Column 3, statistically significant. Finally, the principal 
component extracted from these series is also positively and significantly related to bank density 
(Column 5). So, counties with more banks per capita appear to have greater credit availability: lower 
interest rates, a higher fraction of indebted farms, greater debt to value ratios, and a higher mortgage 
credit to deposit ratio. 
In the estimates in Table 13A, we instrumented banks per capita directly with average rainfall 
(because the system is exactly identified, this is equivalent to the three stage least squares estimate). 
Alternatively, we could include the Gini coefficient instrumented with rainfall. The estimates for the 
Gini are reported in Table 13B, are the expected sign and, again with the exception of column 3, are 
statistically significant. In Table 13C, we show the results in Column 5 of Table 13A (for the 
principal component) is robust to the inclusion of our usual economic controls. In sum, access to 
credit appears lower in areas with concentrated land holdings.  
But this suggests one more question. The obvious alternative explanation of our findings is 
that credit was costlier and less of it was obtained in concentrated counties because potential 
borrowers were riskier and less creditworthy. Two pieces of evidence already weigh against this 
explanation. First, the mortgage credit to deposit ratio was lower in more concentrated counties, 
suggesting that local deposits seemed plentiful relative to the credit that was given – consistent with 
the notion that credit was constrained by supply rather than constrained by the low quality of potential 
                                                                                                                                                       
qualitatively on which measure is used, so we use the latter, though results are available for the former from the 
authors.   38
borrowers. Second, the historical percentage of crop failures in more concentrated counties was 
somewhat lower, suggesting that farming, if anything, was less risky. 
Nevertheless, one way to tell the “deliberate rationing” explanation-- that potential borrowers 
were deliberately rationed -- apart from the “naturally constrained” explanation -- where the potential 
borrowers in concentrated counties were lower quality – is to look at the default experience. If 
borrowers were deliberately rationed, with the lower quality tenants being most frozen out of the 
market for formal credit in counties with high land concentration, we should find a better default 
experience (i.e., lower loan defaults) there relative to counties with low concentration. By contrast, if 
they were naturally constrained, we should find that the default experience is, if anything, worse 
because the underlying quality of the borrower group is lower in counties with high concentration. 
This is what we finally turn to examine. 
V.   LAND CONCENTRATION AND THE DEFAULT EXPERIENCE 
Unfortunately, we do not have data on the loan default experience, county by county. 
However, we do have data on state bank failures from the FDIC, including the value of deposits in 
suspended state banks
28. We can therefore compute the ratio of deposits in suspended state banks in 
the period 1931-36 (which covers the bulk of bank failures during the Depression – few banks failed 
after 1934)  to the level of deposits in 1930. In Figure 4, we plot the fraction of failed deposits across 
regions. The failure rate was highest in counties in the Mid West and Pacific regions. 
The failure rate is a noisy proxy for defaults on mortgage loans, for banks could have failed 
for reasons other than loan losses, such as speculation on securities. Moreover, losses on loans might 
not translate into bank failures in a continuous way – a bank in one county may have serious losses 
but may just avoid failure, while a similar bank in another county may lose just a little more and fail. 
                                                 
28 Because state banks and national banks may have done different things, and because the mix varies across 
counties in deterministic ways, we decided to focus on state bank lending. The results for national bank lending 
are not qualitatively different.   39
Unfortunately, it is the only data that we have, and because it is noisy, we will have to take extra 
precautions to weed out outliers and influential observations.  
 In Table 14A Column 1, we estimate the 3SLS regression outlined in the system of equations 
(1)-(3) described in the last section, but with the fraction of failed state bank deposits as the 
dependent variable.  As we see, the coefficient estimate on banks per capita is positive but not 
statistically significant. Recognizing that this may be because of the noise in the variable, we use a 
Huber and bi-weighting procedure to identify influential observations, dropping the 5 percent most 
influential observations from the sample (Hamilton (1991)).
29 When we estimate the 3SLS for the 
reduced sample in Column 2, we find the coefficient is significantly higher, statistically significant, 
and more precisely estimated. A one standard deviation increase in the number of banks increases the 
fraction of defaulted state bank deposits by 0.36 of its standard deviation.  
In Column 3, we replace state banks per capita in 1920 with state banks per capita in 1930 
and find similar results. In Column 4, we replace state banks per capita with the Gini (instrumented 
by rainfall), and find a negative and significant coefficient. The evidence is clear; counties with more 
concentrated land holdings had a lower, not higher, fraction of deposits failed.   
To further gauge the robustness of these results, we retain the full available sample, and 
replicate the preceding specifications in columns 2-4 using instrumental variables quantile 
regressions.  Estimates of the conditional median are less affected by influential observations 
(Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008)). The results in columns 1-3 of Table 14B continue to suggest a 
robust relationship between bank structures and loan losses. In column 1, for example, a one standard 
deviation increase in the number of banks increases the fraction of defaulted state bank deposits by 
about 0.23 of its standard deviation. Finally, as an additional check, in the four columns of Table 14C, 
we include the various economic controls we have encountered earlier in our baseline regression of 
                                                 
29 Using robust regression estimation, we estimate the second stage of the baseline instrumented variable 
regression, and determine the weights the robust regression attributes to observations. We then drop the 5% of 
the observations that are accorded the least weight by the regression.   40
Table 14A Column 2: the coefficient on banks per capita remains positive and statistically 
significant.
30  
  In sum, even though our proxy for loan losses is crude, it suggests that loans in counties 
with more concentrated land holdings were, if anything, less risky – the ratio of deposits of failed 
state banks to total deposits was lower in such counties. This supports the view that credit from the 
formal sector in such counties was restricted to those with better underlying creditworthiness. This 
then makes the finding that interest rates were higher in such counties, while access to credit was 
lower, more consistent with a supply side constraint – access to credit was limited – than a demand 
side explanation – the potential borrowers were less creditworthy.   
VI.   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this paper suggests that the nature of local constituencies had substantial 
influence over the course of banking development in the United States, even as recently as the early 
twentieth century when the United States was well on its way to becoming the foremost industrial 
economy in the world.  
Not only do we find fewer banks per capita in counties with a more concentrated distribution 
of farm land, we also find that interest rates were higher for land mortgage loans, while measures of 
the availability of credit were lower. Finally, we also find that loan losses were lower in counties that 
had more concentrated land holdings, suggesting that the greater riskiness of the underlying pool of 
borrowers cannot explain our results.  
                                                 
30 Counties that had more concentrated land holdings or rainfall had a somewhat greater share of value added in 
manufacturing in 1930 (see Table 6). While the Great Depression was probably not any less severe on small and 
medium manufacturers than on farming, it might be that greater bank diversification across agriculture and 
manufacturing was what led to lower failures in concentrated counties. We can include either the share of 
manufacturing, the value added in manufacturing per capita, or the quantity of power used per capita in the 
county, and their respective squares, as measures of the extent of diversification. Even though we lose 
approximately 300 observations and the standard errors go up, the coefficient estimates on banks per capita go 
up in magnitude by about 20 percent (relative to Table 14 A Column 2) in all cases and are statistically 
significant in two out of three cases.      41
While the political economy within the counties is a plausible explanation of the differential 
access to credit we do not have sufficient evidence to suggest that large landowners actively 
suppressed access to credit. It is possible that in the counties with concentrated land holdings, large 
landowners had no incentive to press for financial development, while the absence of a powerful 
group of mid-sized farmers pushing for financial access, and the political weakness of small and 
tenant farmers, implied banking remained underdeveloped. Benign neglect rather than malign intent 
could explain many, but not all, of our findings.   
Note that throughout our analysis, we have focused on the United States, and we have 
corrected for state fixed effects. It is interesting then that we find large effects, even though 
institutions that are commonly thought of as important for economic growth, such as broad political 
and legal institutions, are held relatively constant. This is not to suggest that institutions are 
unimportant (we have nothing to say on that), but rather that large variations in developmental 
outcomes may stem simply from differences in the distribution of economic wealth and power in a 
society (see Banerjee and Iyer (2005), Ramcharan (2009) or Rajan (2009), for recent studies). 
Examining the relative importance of constitutions and constituencies or, equivalently, institutions 
and interests, is a task for future research.     
Finally, it is interesting that counties with more limited banking competition seemed to have 
fared better during the Great Depression. This does not necessarily mean that less competition is 
better ex ante, for the Great Depression was a tail event that was unexpected. To base policy on an 
outcome that is of low probability is probably unwise. Nevertheless, we should also note that land 
prices were bid higher relative to fundamentals (such as crop productivity) in counties with more 
banks in the 1920s. Does more bank competition fuel asset price bubbles? Could this have created 
more fragility before the Depression? Is such competition good or bad for long run growth? Those are 
important questions to tackle in future research, especially in light of the current economic crisis 
enveloping the world.  
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Table 1: Variables’ Definitions and Sources 
Variable Source  Definition 
Land Inequality 
(Gini Coefficient) 
United States Bureau of 
Census; Inter-University 
Consortium for Political 
and Social Research 
(ICPSR) NOs: 0003, 
0007,0008,0009,0014,0017 
The number of farms are distributed across the following size 
(acres) bins: 3-9; 10-19 acres; 20-49 acres; 50-99 acres; 100-
174;175-259;260-499;500-999; 1000 and above. We use the 
mid point of each bin to construct the Gini coefficient; farms 
above 1000 acres are assumed to be 1000 acres. The Gini 








nm n n i y

       
Where farms are ranked in ascending order of size,  i y , and n 
is the total number of farms, while m is the mean farm size. 
[Atkinson, A.B. (1970)]. At the state level, we sum the total 
number of farms in each bin across counties, then compute 
the Gini coefficient. 
Number of State and National  
Banks Active in each county. 
Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Data on Banks 
in the United States, 1920-
1936 (ICPSR  07).  
 
 Urban Population; Fraction of 
Black Population; Fraction of 
Population Between 7 and 20 
years; County Area; County 
Population; Value of Crops/ 
Farm Land Divided by Farm 
Population 
United States Bureau of 
Census; Inter-University 
Consortium for Political 
and Social Research 
(ICPSR) NOs: 0003, 
0007,0008,0009,0014,0017 
 
Distance From Mississippi 
River; Atlantic; Pacific and the 
Great Lakes.  
Computed Using ArcView 
from each county’s 
centroid.  
 
Annual Mean Rainfall   Weather Source 
10 Woodsom Drive 
Amesbury MA, 01913 
(Data Compiled from the 
National Weather Service 
Cooperative (COOP) 
Network  
The COOP Network consists of more than 20,000 sites across 
the U.S., and has monthly precipitation observations for the 
past 100 years. However, for a station’s data to be included in 
the county level data, the station needs to have a minimum of 
10 years history and a minimum data density of 90 percent: 
ratio of number of actual observations to potential 
observations. If one or more candidate stations meet the 
above criteria the stations’ data are averaged to produce the 
county level observations. If no candidate station exists 
within the county, the nearest candidate up to 40 miles away 
in the next county is substituted. The arithmetic mean and 
standard deviation level of rainfall are computed from the 
monthly data for all years with available data.  
Annual Standard Deviation Growing 
Degree Days 
Weather Source 
10 Woodsom Drive 
Amesbury MA, 01913 
(Data Compiled from the 
COOP Network
Computations are similar to rainfall. Growing degree days (GDD) 
derived by taking the average of the daily high and low temperature 
each day and subtracting the baseline temperature, which for most 
counties is 10 degrees Celsius. For example a day with a high of 20C 
and a low of 16C would correspond to 8 GDD.
Weighted Standard Deviation of 
Elevation 
Weather Source 
10 Woodsom Drive 
Amesbury MA, 01913 
 
The number of square miles of each county’s land area is listed from 
below 100 meters, 0–100 meters; 100–200 meters; the bins increase 
in increments of 100 meters up to 5,000 meters. The weighted 
standard deviation is then computed, with the weight being the share 
of land area in each elevation category. 
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Table 2. County Level Variables, Summary Statistics 
 
  Circa 1920  Circa 1930 




Land Gini   0.43  0.10  0.43 0.10 
All Banks, Number Per 100 Square Kilometers  0.08  0.51  0.07 0.40 
All Banks, Per 1000 Inhabitants  0.48  0.04  0.37 0.26 
State banks, as fraction of all banks  0.71  0.25  0.69 0.27 
County  Area  (Logs)  7.38 0.98  7.38 0.98 
National banks, Per 1000 Inhabitants  0.11  0.130  0.09  0.10 
Total Population (Logs)  9.76  1.03  9.81 1.05 
Urban Population  19.01  24.83  21.30 25.73 
Population Density   61.13  902.56  67.75 836.09 
Black Population, as a fraction of total population  0.12  0.19  0.11 0.18 
5-17 year olds, as a fraction of total population  0.30  0.04  0.30 0.04 
Per capita value added in manufacturing, 1920  (logs)  0.01  0.66  ---  --- 
Per capita value of crops, in 1920 (logs)  -0.63  0.51  ---  --- 




Value of cereals, as a share of total agriculture value add 42.23 25.06  35.80 26.34 




Per capita value added in agriculture, 1930   ---  ---  3981.91  4751.81 
Distance  from  Mississippi  1032163.00 808239.30  1032163.00 808239.30 
Distance  from  Atlantic  1884416.00 1418925.00  1884416.00 1418925.00 
Distance from Great Lakes  1347100.00  926554.80  1347100.00  926554.80 
Distance  from  Pacific  3686264.00 1415177.00  3686264.00 1415177.00 
Annual average rainfall (inches)  36.41  13.68  36.41  13.68 
Proportion of owner occupied homes   0.528  0.140  0.509  0.134 
Average farm size (logs),   5.019  0.9403  5.009  0.975 
Number of farms (logs)  7.333  1.005  7.302  0.977 
Percent of acreage reporting crop failures  ---  ---  1.270  1.602 
Share of the value of manufacturing output to the 
value of manufacturing and agriculture output 
0.392 0.306  0.502 0.311 
Fraction of tenant farmers  0.335  0.196  0.375  0.209 
Fraction of sharecroppers  0.159  0.114  ---  --- 
Fraction of cash tenants  0.073  0.076  ---  --- 
Average interest rate  ---  ---  6.480  0.683 
Fraction of indebted farms  ---  ---  0.498  0.151 
Average mortgage debt, as a percent of farm values  ---  ---  37.378  8.08 
Average mortgage debt, as a percent of state bank 
deposits 
--- ---  1.298  2.916 
Total deposits of suspended state banks, 1931-1936, as 
a share of state bank deposits in 1930. 
--- ---  28.051  33.151 
Sources and definitions in Table 1.  
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The shaded rectangle represents the interquartile range, which contains the median—the solid line. The ends of the vertical lines extend to a 
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Table 3: State Laws and Landed Interests 
 





  Branching Permitted =1, 
1900-1929 
Branching Permitted =1, 
1900-1929 
Land Concentration  -2.256** -2.311** 
  [1.039]  [1.0208] 
Population  --- 0.009 
  ---  [0.009] 
Population Density  --- 0.278** 
  ---  [0.129] 
Urban Population  --- -0.411 
  ---  [0.840] 
Black Population (Fraction)  --- -0.463 
  ---  [2.483] 
Per Capita Wealth (Real 
Property) 
--- 0.009** 
  ---  [0.003] 
    
Observations  189  189 
R-squared  0.67 0.71 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Columns 1 and 2 include state and year fixed 
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The shaded rectangle represents the interquartile range, which contains the median—the solid line. The ends of the vertical lines extend to a 
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Table 4. Bank Density and Land Concentration, OLS Estimates 
 
Dependent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
(OLS)  (OLS)  (OLS) 
Banks per Capita 
1920 
Banks per Capita 
1930 
Banks per Capita  
(County Fixed 
Effects) 
        
Land Concentration  -110.86*** -63.44*** -141.00*** 
  [10.30]  [5.33]  [34.6] 
County Area (log)  -0.11 -1.71*  --- 
  [0.98]  [0.70]  --- 
Distance from Mississippi (log)  3.79*** 1.55*  --- 
  [0.80]  [0.60]  --- 
Distance from Atlantic (log)  -1.09 -0.17  --- 
  [0.72]  [0.52]  --- 
Distance from Great Lakes (log)  4.45 2.89  --- 
  [2.41]  [1.66]  --- 
Distance from Pacific (log)  1.44 1.67  --- 
  [2.25]  [1.61]  --- 
     
Observations  2907  2934  6036 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. Columns 1 and 2 include state dummy 
variables—these are absorbed in the county fixed effects in column 3. All coefficients multiplied by 100,000.  55




























Share of land in grains and seeds ‐0.0480* ‐0.0239 1
Share of land in hay and forage ‐0.1751* ‐0.1591* ‐0.0227 1
Share of land in fruits and nuts 0.3410* ‐0.2843* ‐0.0489* ‐0.0159 1
Share of land in vegetables 0.2990* ‐0.3773* ‐0.0278* 0.0634* 0.1629* 1
Average annual rainfall 0.3458* ‐0.2123* ‐0.1668* ‐0.4609* 0.0421* 0.1183* 1
 
(*) significance at the 5% level or higher 
 
Table 6: Rainfall, Land Concentration, and Economic Outcomes. 

















Value of produce per acre ($) 15.95 15.11 13.43 17.04 9.61 7.35 8.77 8.55
Percent of Crops that Failed in 
1930 . . . . 0.70 0.85 0.69 0.88
Average Farm Size (acres) 88 191 96 145 84 192 94 147
Share of Manufacturing in 
county 0.37 0.25 0.39 0.24 0.50 0.43 0.51 0.42
Fraction of housing in county 
that is owner occupied
0.50 0.58 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.55 0.48 0.56
Value of land per acre 34.34 46.20 32.59 48.99 24.46 32.42 24.84 30.84
Number of banks per 10000 
people 2.71 6.23 2.78 5.91 1.87 3.96 1.90 3.99
Deposits per bank . . . . 392.73 400.60 420.92 380.29
All data winsorized at .01
Land Concentration 1920 Land Concentration 1930 Rainfall Average 1920 Rainfall Average 1930
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Table 7 A. Bank Structure and Land Concentration, IV Estimates 2
nd Stage 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 















  (IV)  (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)  (2SLS) 














         
Land Concentration  -481.041***  -496.036***  -234.706***  -4712.885***  -78.683**  -465.171*** 
[84.500] [92.800] [61.000] [1030.000]  [29.900] [84.000] 
County Area (log)  -1.033  -2.14  -1.976*  -499.693***  2.28*  -1.832 
[1.450] [1.740] [0.987] [27.800]  [1.070] [1.650] 
Distance from 
Mississippi (log) 
-2.131  -0.595  0.8084  17.852  3.357***  -0.3312 
[1.670] [1.360] [0.714] [17.400]  [0.693] [1.270] 
Distance from 
Atlantic (log) 
-14.391***  -13.539***  -4.158*  -145.991***  0.9691  -12.494*** 
[3.310] [3.520] [1.750] [42.100]  [1.150] [3.180] 
Distance from Great 
Lakes (log) 
8.879***  8.486***  3.357**  47.66  1.389  7.961*** 
[1.740] [2.140] [1.200] [36.600]  [0.886] [1.980] 
Distance from Pacific 
(log) 
-10.214*  -10.458*  -4.722  28.167  0.4398  -9.557* 
[4.970] [5.130] [3.100] [48.400]  [2.530] [4.830] 
Illiterate population 
share 
  55.618  32.317  1606.574***  -81.822***  45.35 
 [42.900]  [29.100] [443.000]  [15.400] [39.700] 
Urban population 
share 
  -0.1514*  -0.2379***  0.2726  -0.3722***  -0.1641** 
 [0.063]  [0.033] [0.746]  [0.033] [0.060] 
Log of Total 
Population 
  1.775  1.757  494.818***  -4.371***  1.272 
 [2.080]  [1.320] [27.100]  [1.090] [1.940] 
African-American 
population share 
  8.89  5.503  -196.931*  19.732***  9.492 
 [8.140]  [3.830] [88.100]  [3.790] [7.720] 
Youth population 
(7-20) share 
  -111.728  -194.95***  -4708.142***  -197.733***  -113.118** 
 [41.700]  [25.500] [462.000]  [22.100] [40.200] 
             
Observations  2907 2907 2934 2907  2573 2907 
Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. All specifications include state dummy 
variables. All coefficients multiplied by 100,000.   57
Table 7B; First Stage Estimates  
  (1)   (2)   
         
Dependent Variable  Land 
Concentration 
in 1920 
  Land Concentration in 
1920 
 
         
Average Rainfall  13.90 ***  13.00 *** 
  [2.46]    [2.28]   
County Area (log)  3.23   -61.10 * 
  [30.50]   [31.60]  
Distance from Mississippi (log)  -117.00  ***  -50.60  ** 
  [22.70]    [21.40]   
Distance from Atlantic (log)  -352.00 ***  -330.00 *** 
  [31.20]   [32.20]  
Distance from Great Lakes (log)  106.00  ***  158.00  *** 
  [30.80]    [27.60]   
Distance from Pacific (log)  -213.00 **  -192.00 ** 
  [91.30]   [82.30]  
Illiterate population share      3370.00  *** 
      [471.00]   
Urban population share     5.10  *** 
     [0.86]   
Log of Total Population      129.00  *** 
      [25.80]   
African-American population share     -201.00   
     [140.00]   
Youth population (7-20) share      111.00   
      [637.00]   
        
Observations  2907    2907   
R^2  0.0944   0.2129   
         
Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. All specifications include state dummy 
variables. All coefficients multiplied by 100,000.   58
Table 8. Banks Per Capita 1920 and Land Concentration, Robustness. 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  IV  IV  IV  IV 
Land 
Concentration 
-510.50*  -480.71***  -486.84***  -426.05***   
[227.86]  [120.67]  [121.57]  [112.32]   
Average Farm 
Size (log) 
-1.88  ---  ---   
[7.52]  ---  ---   
Number of 
Farms (log) 
-11.43  ---  ---   
[7.91]  ---  ---   
Fraction owner 
occupied homes 
---  -18.33  ---   




--- ---  2.20   
---  ---  [2.17]   
Value of land per 
acre (log) 
    
8.58***   
       [2.19]   
       
Observations  2907  2906  2907  2906 
Standard errors in brackets adjusted for spatial correlation. ***,**,* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent levels. All regressions include state dummy variables, county area, population, distance from major 
waterways, illiteracy rate, black population, urbanization, young population.  Land concentration is 
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Table 9:  Banks per capita and factors that change the incentives and the 
economic power of the landed 
 




































Explanatory variables         
Land Concentration  -318.27*  -298.50**  -484.30***  -541.28  -164.33**  -645.84*** 
  [149.49]  [114.92]  [110.75]  [583.37]  [81.72] [198.61] 
Land Concentration 
*Tenants Share 
-789.83**  -805.58***  324.07  ---  ---  --- 
  [322.40]  [241.97]  [307.12]  ---  --- --- 
Tenants Share  442.18**  408.16***  -48.25  ---  ---  --- 
  [153.72]  [119.52]  [143.26]  ---  --- --- 
Tenants Share, Squared  -167.98***  -181.61**  -119.02  ---  ---  --- 
  [51.24]  [72.57]  [99.66]  ---  --- --- 
Land Concentration 
*Texas 
---  ---  ---  -557.30  223.26*  --- 
  --- --- --- [867.02]  [119.80] --- 
Land Concentration 
*Manufacturing  
---  ---  ---  ---  ---  359.12** 
  --- --- --- ---  --- [130.04] 
Manufacturing   ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  -137.74** 
  --- --- --- ---  --- [55.52] 
Manufacturing , 
Squared 
---  ---  ---  ---  ---  -23.60* 
        [13.20] 
Observations  2908 2908 2908 1289  1308  2745 
All specifications include a county’s distance from the Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans; the Great Lakes; the 
Mississippi River; county area; population; illiteracy; urban population share; young population; black 
population; as well as state dummies. Spatially corrected standard errors in brackets:* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant  at 1%.  Columns 4 and 5 use only counties in Southern and Border states. 
Manufacturing share (Column 6) is the fraction of manufacturing value added relative to value added in 
manufacturing and agriculture. All coefficients multiplied by 100,000.   60
Table 10:  National Banks, State Banks, and Land Concentration 
 
  (1) 
 
(2)  (3) 
  (IV)  (IV)  (IV) 
Dependent Variable  National Banks Per Capita, 1920  State Banks Per Capita, 1920  Share of National Banks, 1920 
       
Explanatory Variable      
Land Concentration  -138.26***  -336.24***  -1.39* 
  [41.24]  [90.65]  [0.70] 
       
Observations  2908 2908  2869 
Spatially corrected standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
All specifications include a county’s distance from the Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans; the Great Lakes; the 
Mississippi River; county area; population; illiteracy; urban population share; young population; black 





Table 11. State Banks, National Banks and Distance from State Capitals. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 












Land Concentration  -973.79*  -719.28*  -180.30 
  [441.39]  [326.55]  [109.99] 
Land 
Concentration*Distance 
from State Capital 
1.62  1.36*  0.12 
  [1.02]  [0.76]  [0.26] 
Observations  2908 2908 2908 
R-Squared  0.47 0.53 0.15 
 
Spatially corrected standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
respectively. All regressions include distance from major waterways, area, population, urbanization, black 
population, age structure (5-17 year olds), state dummies. Distance from the state capital enters as a second 
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BOR ENC MA MTN NE PAC SOU WNC
 
Census Regions. BOR:Border; ENC:East North Central; MA:Mid Atlantic; MTN: Mountain; NE: New 
England; PAC:Pacific; SOU: South; WNC: West North Central. The shaded rectangle represents the 
interquartile range, which contains the median—the solid line. The ends of the vertical lines extend to a 
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Table 12. Simple Correlations, Credit Variables 
 
  Mortgage 

















1      
Mortgage Debt to 
Farm Values 
-0.1845*  1       
Fraction of  
Indebted Farms 
-0.3365*  0.2977*  1    
Ratio of Mortgage 
Debt to State Bank 
Deposits 
0.0029  0.2473*  0.0975*  1   
Principal 
Component 
-0.6366*  0.7130*  0.7663*  0.3844* 1 
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Table 13A. Credit Access and Banks Per Capita 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  (IV)  (IV)  (IV)  (IV)  (IV) 




Mortgage Debt as a 
Share of Farm Value  
Mortgage Debt, 
as a Share of 




          
State Banks Per Capita   -1176.7** 1320.7***  7118.4  4459.4***  6553.7*** 
  [412.5] [193.9]  [5936.7]  [1371.2] [1050.2] 
Observations  2902 2904  2902  2698  2697 
 
Table 13B. Credit Access and Land Concentration 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 














5.57** -6.16***  -37.51  -21.13**  -31.22*** 
  [2.34] [1.60]  [27.51]  [8.38]  [7.77] 
Observations  2953 2957  2953  2716  2715 
 
Table 13C. Credit Access and Banks Per Capita: Robustness Checks 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  (IV)  (IV)  (IV)  (IV) 
Dependent Variable  Principal Component 
State Banks Per Capita  7253.3*** 6102.1*** 6292.8***  6237.7***
  [1314.0] [840.6] [860.9]  [891.6]
Average Farm Size (log)  ‐0.0976  
  [0.165]  
Farms (log)  0.5476***  
  [0.087]  
Average productivity of land (log)  0.2758***  
  [0.069]  
Homes owner occupied share  ‐0.9832** 
  [0.437] 
Average Price Per Acre of land (log)    0.1674**
    [0.081]
Observations  2697 2697 2697  2697
     
Spatially corrected standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
respectively. All regressions include distance from major waterways, area, population, urbanization, black 
population, age structure (5-17 year olds), and state dummies. The “Principal Component” is the common first 
component extracted from the 4 measures of credit access. All coefficients are multiplied by 100,000 in Table 
13 B.   64
 

































BOR ENC MA MTN NE PAC SOU WNC
 
Census Regions. BOR:Border; ENC:East North Central; MA:Mid Atlantic; MTN: Mountain; NE: New 
England; PAC:Pacific; SOU: South; WNC: West North Central. The shaded rectangle represents the 
interquartile range, which contains the median—the solid line. The ends of the vertical lines extend to a 
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 1    2  3  4   
  With outliers    Without outliers  Without outliers  Without outliers 
          
State Banks Per 
Capita 1920 
15193.3   29877.4  **        
[15314.5]   [12591.6]         
             
State Banks Per 
Capita 1930 
      66586.7 **    
      [30210.2]     
             
Land 
Concentration(1920) 
         -138.2  ** 
         [67.3]   
             
Observations  2702   2568   2587  2587   
                          
In column 1 all observations are included, in columns 2-4, outliers are dropped using the Huber bi-weighting 
procedure.  
 
















                    
  1   2    3   
          
State Banks Per 
Capita 
18834.3*        
[10726.7]        
          
State Banks Per 
Capita 1930 
    53479.2     
    [35599.0]     
          
Inome Inequality         -86.44*   
       [45.3]   
          
Observations  2702   2721    2721   
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  Without outliers  Without outliers  Without outliers  Without outliers 
  1   2  3    4 
State Banks Per 
Capita 
57693.7  **  25537.6  * 33201.5  ** 24105.2  * 
[21787.2]   [13367.7]   [13725.2]   [14076.4]   
              
Average Farm 
Size (log) 
-7.032  **         
[2.8]            
              
Farms (log)  -1.688       -0.386      
[1.5]       [1.1]      




   2.562  *        
   [1.2]          
              
Homes owner 
occupied share 
       12.95      
       [8.2]      
              
Average Price 
Per Acre of land 
(log) 
           2.948  * 
           [1.4]   
              
Observations  2568   2568   2568   2568   
In columns 1-4, outliers are dropped using the Huber bi-weighting procedure. Spatially corrected standard 
errors in parenthesis in Tables 14 A and 14 C, robust standard errors in Table 14 B.  ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. All regressions include distance from major waterways, 
area, population, urbanization, black population, age structure (5-17 year olds), and state dummies. 